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     The case study described in this thesis involves a process improvement project in the
Tax Department of a Certified Public Accounting firm.  A process map was created by
interviewing employees involved in the process.  A process analysis identified problems
and possible solutions.  The Partners in the firm decided to streamline the process for
simple tax returns in order to make them more profitable.  This study examined what
impact, if any, the process improvement intervention had on key financial and operational
measures.  Results indicated that the tax returns prepared in the new process were faster,
cheaper, and more profitable.  This study indicates that organizations conducting process
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          Performance improvement is a constant concern for most organizations.  With the 
ever-increasing demands of customers and competition in the marketplace, organizations 
must address the issue of performance improvement in order to survive.  Whether it is to 
increase desired performance, decrease undesired performance, or train new performance, 
every organization is forced to deal with this issue in one form or another.  Performance 
improvement specialists have been developing models and tools to help organizations 
deal with performance issues for the last several decades (see Stolovitch & Keeps, 1992).  
The performance improvement area has received attention from both consultants 
(e.g., Dean & Ripley, 1998; Gilbert, 1996; Mager & Pipe, 1984; Malott, 1999; Panza, 
1989, 1998; Robinson & Robinson, 1995; Rummler & Brache, 1995) and behavioral 
researchers (e.g., Huberman & O’Brien, 1999; Jessup & Stahelski, 1999; LaFleur & 
Hyten, 1995; Langeland, Johnson, & Mawhinney, 1998; Wilk & Redmon, 1998).  
Models of performance improvement have helped consultants and their clients assess and 
identify performance issues, develop solutions, and implement performance improvement 
plans.  One influential model is the Behavior Engineering Model (Gilbert, 1978/1996).  
The model consists of six cells that take into account all the environmental and personal 
factors that can influence performance.  This includes the performer’s environment and 
repertory of behavior.  Environmental supports include direction (e.g., feedback, job 
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descriptions, and job aids), resources (e.g., tools and materials), and contingencies (e.g., 
performance contingent pay, nonmonetary incentives, and career development).  Factors 
affecting a person’s repertory of behavior include knowledge (e.g., proper training), 
capacity (e.g., tailoring workload to the individual performer), and motives (e.g., 
recruiting workers whose interests match what the organization can offer).   
Behavior analytic researchers have used behavioral models, principles, and 
techniques to improve performance (see Frederiksen, 1982; O’Brien, Dickinson, & 
Roscow, 1982; Redmon & Dickinson, 1990).  For example, LaFleur and Hyten (1995) 
used Gilbert’s model to help them analyze the causes of performance problems with a 
hotel’s banquet staff.  They used task checklists, feedback, goal setting, monetary 
bonuses, training, and job aids to increase the accuracy and timeliness of meeting room 
preparation.  Jessup and Stahelski (1999) used goal setting, feedback, and incentives to 
decrease the rate of defective anodes in a manufacturing plant.  Huberman and O’Brien 
(1999) employed goal setting, feedback, and reinforcement with therapists and patients in 
a psychiatric group home.  The researchers were successful at enhancing the performance 
of the therapists and improving patients’ welfare.  
Some academics and consultants use systems models of organizations in which 
the organization is viewed horizontally as a set of cross-functional processes, instead of 
vertically as a set of hierarchical job titles.  This horizontal systems view includes the 
internal and external customers, products or services, and the processes through which 
work gets done (Brethower, 1982; Malott, 1999; Panza, 1989; Rummler & Brache, 
1995).  Systems models help identify key accomplishments and the work processes that 
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produce them throughout an entire organization or within an organizational unit (units 
such as departments or divisions are often called functions in these models).    
One intervention derived from systems models is process improvement.  Central 
to this approach for improving performance is process analysis and redesign. “A business 
process is a series of steps designed to produce a product or service.  Some processes 
(such as programming) may be contained wholly within a function.  However, most 
processes (such as order fulfillment) are cross-functional, spanning the ‘white space’ 
between the boxes on the organization chart” (Rummler & Brache, 1995, p. 45).  
Rummler and Brache indicate the most promising opportunities for performance 
improvement can be identified at the “functional interfaces” or “white space” where 
information, products, and/or services are being handed off from one department 
(function) to another.  It is often in the midst of this “white space” that processes fall 
apart; however, these interfaces can be identified and successfully managed through 
process analysis.  
Rummler and Brache (1995) have developed an intricate methodology for carrying 
out this multi-layered process analysis in organizations, and it consists of five clearly 
outlined stages.  The five stages are performance improvement planning, project 
definition, process analysis and design, and implementing the new process.  The first 
stage concentrates on obtaining all the pertinent information such as the organization’s 
strategy, as well as the primary, support, and management processes.  Primary processes 
are those that produce key products or services that external customers will receive, while 
support processes produce products or services that are invisible to the external customer 
but are essential to effectively manage the business.  Management processes are the steps 
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that management must take to support business processes.  The second stage involves 
identifying the variables necessary for superior performance within the industry, 
determining which processes, if improved, will have the most significant impact, and 
designating teams of people who will execute the different steps in the plan.   
The third stage involves documenting the process.  One way of doing this is to create 
a process map, which is a schematic display of all the steps involved in getting work 
done.  An “Is” process map represents the current steps involved in getting work done; 
whereas, a “Should” process map outlines the revised steps of an improved process 
(Rummler & Brache, 1995).  Sometimes the disparity between an “Is” map and a 
“Should” map is large due to the number of disconnects in the “Is” map.  A disconnect is 
anything that interferes with the flow of work (e.g., redundant steps, missing steps, or 
steps that cause major problems that affect the quality, quantity, timeliness, or cost of 
work).   
The fourth and final step of the Rummler and Brache methodology involves assessing 
the organization’s readiness for the implementation of the process improvement ideas.  In 
this stage, new processes are often pilot-tested before wide-scale implementation is 
undertaken.   
Rummler and Brache (1995) reported that they employed this methodology and 
achieved desired results in a number of organizations such as Douglas Aircraft Company 
(a division of McDonnell Douglas Corporation) and GTE.  They helped Douglas Aircraft 
Company design and implement a company-wide performance improvement project.  
The project was centered on the company’s desire to improve customer service through 
higher quality products.  After conducting the first two stages, they created a customer-
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driven “Should” process map.  They compared “Should” and “Is” maps to identify any 
performance gaps.  The team planned and implemented the steps necessary to move from 
the “Is” to the “Should” process.  Unfortunately, as with many non-academic consultants, 
case studies are cited, however, little data is presented to document the exact nature of the 
improvement.   
Carol Panza, another consultant, has also used process improvement to address her 
clients’ needs.  Her methodology is similar to Rummler and Brache; in fact, she used to 
be affiliated with the Rummler Group. Panza (1998) conducted a study that took place in 
National Vision Associates, Limited, which is a retail eye wear/eye care chain that 
operates within large multidepartment chains versus stand-alone outlets. This company 
had grown from 4 to over 300 vision centers within a short period of time.  Because of 
this rapid growth, standardized operating procedures were never created.  Panza was 
called in to develop the specifications for a learning system that would allow the 
company to train new employees entering the organization and then move them into 
vision center management, which would support planned growth.  Previous data showed 
that individual store performance was inconsistent and depended on the quality of the 
market area, managers, and/or district managers to whom individual vision centers 
reported. With no company standard for getting work done, managers and district 
managers were creating individual processes for their respective stores.  Because the 
processes were inconsistent across stores, it was difficult to make data comparisons 
between existing stores and to get new stores up-to-speed in a timely manner.  This lack 
of standard processes also created opportunity for improvements in existing stores.   
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Panza’s “process level” analysis examined the sequence of accomplishments required 
to produce a valuable product or service.  The end product of this analysis was a process 
map outlining the necessary accomplishments to be performed by management-level 
employees.  This differed from a traditional Rummler and Brache “Is” map in that it did 
not outline the steps necessary to carry out the accomplishments. Another product of the 
Panza process analysis was the roles matrix, which was “used to match job or role 
accomplishment to specific processes (e.g., field sales, customer service, etc.) and 
identify any performance issues”(Panza, 1998, p. 59).  However, Panza did not include an 
example, so the exact nature of this tool is not known.  A “position level analysis” 
identified environmental variables that need to be in place to support performers in the 
organization. 
When the whole assessment was completed, Panza created “performance support 
summaries” which outlined the accomplishments that must be executed by the specific 
job level and the required behaviors for achieving these accomplishments.  These 
summaries helped the organization create well-defined job descriptions and selection 
criteria.  Skills were taught in phases with some being taught through on-the-job-training 
and others in a classroom environment that used job aids.  For example, customer call-
back training was carried out through on-the-job training while managing the 
merchandising and promotions calendar was trained in a classroom setting. Panza also 
identified feedback requirements and suggested where incentives were appropriate.   
The results of this project showed that the audit scores of store managers who went 
through training increased from 55% to 80%.  Scores reflected administrative 
performance in managing finances, legal issues, and inventory.  The average number of 
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customer complaints per store decreased from 12 to 5 while the number of stores 
increased from 310 to 341 during the same time period.  Results also indicated that there 
was a decrease in the number of improper orders placed.  Some evidence showed that 
turnover decreased amongst the managers trained in the learning system.  Informal 
measures indicated that the store culture has changed to one in which all employees 
actively work towards store success.   
In some business circles, Hammer and Champy (1993) are viewed as pioneers of 
process reengineering.  According to them, “reengineering is the fundamental rethinking 
and radical redesign of business processes to achieve dramatic improvements in critical, 
contemporary measures of performance, such as cost, quality, service, and speed” 
(Hammer & Champy, 1993, p. 32).   However, they do not have a strict assessment 
methodology.  “The bad news about redesigning a work process is that it is not 
algorithmic and routine.  There are no seven- or ten-step procedures that will 
mechanically produce a radical new process design” (Hammer & Champy, 1993, p. 134).  
The only step that is standard in their procedure is to start with a blank slate or a clean 
sheet of paper.  The danger in their methodology is that it runs the risk of reengineering 
processes that do not need to be reengineered.  They themselves have said, 
“reengineering ignores what is and concentrates on what should be” (Hammer & 
Champy, 1993, p. 33).  “Reengineering is about business reinvention—not business 
improvement, business enhancement, or business modification” (p. 33).  Some processes 
are perfectly suited to achieve the result needed while other processes only need slight 
modifications.  A company could lose significant amounts of time and money by 
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prematurely conducting a process reengineering effort without first determining the 
performance of current processes and comparing this with desired processes.  
Hammer and Champy’s proposed methodology may seem drastic, but it has yielded 
desired results.  They cited an example in which the IBM Credit Corporation applied 
their methods to improve the credit approval process.  IBM estimated that average 
turnaround time for a credit approval was 6 days.  The “Is” process started when a sales 
representative submitted a credit approval to IBM’s Credit Corporation and ended 6 days 
and 7 people later at which time an administrator took all the relevant information and 
sent a final answer to the sales representative via overnight mail.  The “Should” process 
consisted of the same general steps; however, one person carried out each step and had 
access to all the information the previous people in the process used.  In the end, they 
reduced turnaround time by 90% (from 6 days to 4 hours) and the number of customers 
who accepted IBM’s credit deal increased by 100 times.     
The problem with Hammer and Champy’s methodology (1993) is that they have not 
outlined their procedure in any of these examples.  For example, they do not explain how 
they come to know the “Is” process in any of these organizations.  They also do not 
explain how or if they conduct any kind of initial performance assessment.  Adhering to 
Rummler and Brache or Panza’s methodology takes away a lot of the risk inherent in the 
Hammer and Champy style of process redesign.   
Some researchers (e.g., Kumar & Motwani, 1999) have proposed process 
improvement projects but have not actually carried them out, so they provide no 
quantitative data on actual results. Kumar and Motwani (1999) proposed a process 
reengineering plan in a midwestern bank.  The bank was having problems with its 
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lending procedure for small businesses.  The proposed plan was based on best practices 
of other banks.  Data collection methods included interviews, direct observations, and 
gathering information through archival sources.  To determine the steps involved in the 
lending process, interviews were conducted with executives who knew the process.  
Interviews were conducted in person and lasted from 40 min to 2 hr.  Direct observations 
were made of employees (management and non-management) from the different 
departments that participated in the process.  Unstructured interviews also took place 
with some employees during the direct observations.  The “Is” process consisted of five 
stages: origination, underwriting, document preparation, loan closing, and loan booking.  
Most of the problems identified during the assessment consisted of timeliness and 
efficiency issues.  Instead of the process meeting a 2-day turnaround, it was usually 
taking 1-2 weeks.  A large part of this time was due to interoffice mail.  When one phase 
of the process was complete, it usually required passing paperwork from one person to 
another or requesting paperwork be filed from one person to another.  The mechanism for 
transferring the paperwork or requests was interoffice mail, which usually took at least 1 
day.  Also, some of the requisite paperwork asked for the same basic information 
(company name, address, and loan terms) in addition to differing information.  Only a 
small percentage of the business loans the bank processed were for small businesses, so 
they did not have any standard loan products for small business loans.  This meant that 
each loan officer had to reconstruct new terms and conditions for each small business 
loan they accepted.  This proved to be a de-motivating contingency because loan officers 
preferred working on large business loans, which were more profitable.  This caused loan 
officers to put a lower priority on small business loans.  The proposed new process 
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eliminated some unnecessary paperwork, combined a few steps, and reduced the number 
of people working on a loan.  Kumar and Motwani (1999) proposed buying workgroup 
software so that forms and requests could be submitted electronically.  This would 
eliminate the interoffice mail lag times.  In addition to the process change, they also 
proposed creating job tools such as checklists, and standardized forms and providing 
training to the Branch Managers on all the particulars of small business lending practices.  
The researchers also recommended advertising and marketing ideas to promote the new 
improved process and extra services being offered to small businesses.  Suggestions 
included direct mail fliers and telemarketing.   
Kumar and Motwani (1999) suggested that future results data would indicate 
bottom-line savings, increase productivity, decrease costs (due to decreases in turnaround 
time), and standardize work papers.  After the proposed process is implemented, the 
authors expected that customers would receive loan request answers within 24 hrs with 
the new automated documentation system, and that underwriters and branch managers 
would have instant access to all customer information.   
Hayes and Helms (1999) documented a process improvement case study with 
actual data, but their methodology is unclear and it is not apparent what role, if any, the 
researchers played in the project. The case study took place in a utility company.  In the 
midst of rapidly increasing competition, the utility company in this study was having 
problems with the turnaround time for new installations. A new order had to pass through 
four departments before installation was final which required an average of 48 days from 
start to finish.  After creating an “Is” map, a team was formed to address problems in the 
process.  The team was made up of one representative from each department and three 
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from the construction department because it was involved in one of the most complicated 
parts of the process.  After brainstorming on possible solutions, the team decided to 
implement the quickest idea because they were under a time constraint.  The simple idea 
consisted of renting new equipment.  The new equipment reduced cycle time, but not 
significantly enough to satisfy the team.  A second, smaller team was created to 
brainstorm.  This team decided to eliminate some steps by installing an automated 
tracking system.  Up to that point, nobody knew when a new service request entered the 
system and went from one department to another.  This yielded improvements in 
reporting and communication to each department, but it had no effect on turnaround time.  
The team re-assembled and decided to restructure the construction department, which 
was responsible for a large proportion of the work completed in the process.  The 
construction department was structured so that every job came to a scheduler who then 
dispersed the work (up to 100 orders per week) to 5 areas consisting of 43 different 
crews.  They eliminated the scheduler, assigned one supervisor to each of the 5 areas and 
divided the crews into each area (10-11 crews per area).  Scheduling orders became the 
supervisors’ responsibility thus eliminating a bottleneck in the process.  By restructuring 
the construction department, the process became more streamlined.  As a result, cycle 
time decreased from 14 to 4.8 days.        
Malott (1999) has employed process improvement techniques, using a methodology 
similar to Rummler and Brache (1995), but has not published any case studies that 
include quantitative results.  Other researchers have also investigated or documented 
process redesign projects, but either they do not have a clear methodology, quantitative 
results, or both (see Coulson-Thomas, 1997; Denton, 1995; Nwabueze & Kanji, 1997; 
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Webster & Black, 1998).  Because much of the literature on process improvement is 
unclear in describing either methodology or quantitative results, replications of this 
technique are difficult.  Process improvement studies that could provide quantitative data 
on the results of the intervention would be especially valuable to the research community.   
The case study described in this thesis involves a process improvement project in the 
Tax Department of a Certified Professional Accounting (C.P.A.) firm.  This organization 
is a professional service firm that operates on a time and billing system.  Their product is 
not only a complete tax return, but also, how much billable time is produced and how 
much of the time is billed to the client.  Anyone doing any work on a tax job accumulates 
charge hours according to an hourly rate designated for each employee.  Managers in the 
firm were concerned that certain kinds of work done in the Tax Department were 
accumulating charge hours that could not be billed to the client because that amount 
would exceed what the client considered a fair price for such work.  The managers 
requested an assessment of their process and ideas for process improvement.  Ultimately, 
a process improvement plan was implemented.   
This study examined what impact, if any, the process improvement intervention had 
on key financial and operational measures for the Tax Department.  This process redesign 
project focused mainly on within-department processes, i.e., how tax returns were 
completed by the employees at several levels in the Tax Department.  This is a smaller 
scale application of process improvement than the organization-wide, cross-functional 
process improvements described by Rummler and Brache (1995).  However, a within-
department process focus is appropriate in this case because the Tax Department 
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functions in a very independent fashion in this firm.  The study will include a detailed 







     METHOD 
 
 
Employees and Setting   
The study took place in the Tax Department at an accounting firm in Dallas, 
Texas.  The accounting firm employed approximately 85 employees in 7 departments 
(Tax, Audit, Accounting Services, Compensation & Benefits, Consulting, Resources & 
Operations Management, and Administrative).  The Tax Department was one of the 
largest departments in the company and generated a high volume of projects and profits.  
Because of the volume of work generated by the Tax Department, the Partners (who were 
both owners and top management) were able to sell other services offered by the 
accounting firm to tax clients.  Twenty-one Tax Department employees participated in 
this study in 1999 and 22 participated in 2000.  In 2000, the department lost 4 employees 
from 1999 (2 Staff, 1 Senior, and 1 Senior Manager) and gained 5 new employees.  There 
were 3 Senior Managers, 4 Managers, 9 Seniors, and 5 Staff in 1999.  In 2000, there were 
2 Senior Managers, 4 Managers, 11 Seniors, and 5 Staff.  Employees will be referred to 
according to their job title (e.g., Manager, Staff, etc…) and their function.  Employees 
functioned in two roles in the Tax Department.  Preparers were any employee (e.g. Senior 
Manager) who worked on preparing a tax return.  Reviewers were any employee who 
worked on reviewing a tax return.  Full-time employees were salaried, while part-time 
employees earned an hourly wage.   
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Procedure 
Nature of the problem.  In June of 1999, the Chief Financial Officer of the 
accounting firm requested a process assessment in the Tax Department.  Prior to this 
study, the department was experiencing some timeliness and quality problems.  
Timeliness issues included not meeting a 30-day standard for all clients during peak tax 
season, and exceeding a 2-week turnaround standard for preparations.  Quality of work 
issues included a time budgeting of projects that encouraged speed over quality, and Tax 
Preparers making too many mistakes, thus requiring extensive review of their work.  The 
Tax Partners were particularly concerned with the perceived inefficiency of the tax return 
process.  They believed that improved efficiency could increase profitability.  This was a 
major concern for them because processing tax returns made up 97% of the work in this 
department.  The Tax Department was also the largest department in the company and 
generated a high volume of business, so problems in this area would have a major impact 
on the organization as a whole.   
Assessment.  The assessment was conducted via formal interviews with Partners, 
Managers, and Senior employees in the Tax Department.  Each interview was held in a 
conference room and took place with two interviewers (Dr. Cloyd Hyten and me) and one 
employee at a time.  Each interview lasted between 1 and 1-½ hrs.  Interviewers 
developed a set of questions to determine what happens from the time work is assigned to 
the time the final product is sent to the client (see Appendix A).  The questions were used 
with all interviewees; however, every question was not used in every interview.  The 
questions asked depended on the tasks performed by the interviewee.  For example, Staff 
were not asked questions pertaining to how Reviewers check projects because Staff never 
 16
conducted reviews.  The questions were designed to determine all the steps involved in 
getting work done in that department and to discover any inconsistencies or other 
problems in the process across employees.  When inconsistencies were discovered, 
employees were asked additional questions to determine if there was a decision rule 
involved in that part of the process.  For example, some employees prioritized work 
differently.  After asking additional questions, it became apparent that the decision rule in 
this case depended on the order of work coming in, deadlines, whether or not a Partner 
requested it, existing workload, and the nature of the task.  A problem area that was 
identified involved retrieving information from Partners.  Some Partners took days to get 
answers back to employees.  This could cause timeliness problems in the process.     
Process map.  An “Is” process map was created based on all the information 
collected during the interviews (see Appendix A). The process map was categorized into 
the five stages of the tax return process: client requests, work assignment, preparation, 
review, and final processing.  Each stage was made up of one or more steps.  As 
previously mentioned, all of the steps in the process were executed by all levels of 
employees (Partners, Senior Managers, Managers, Seniors, and Staff); however, to 
simplify this explanation, we will refer to the employees by the function they were 
executing.  Again, Preparers were employees who prepared tax returns and Reviewers 
were employees who reviewed tax returns.  Since the department processed tax returns 
that varied in degrees of difficulty, all levels of employees prepared tax returns while 
only Partners, Senior Managers, and Managers reviewed work.    
The process started once a client made a request for tax return services.  After 
making the request, an employee from the company’s Administrative Department 
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assigned the work, based on the Preparers’ skill level, workload, deadlines, and project 
difficulty.  The Administrative employee would hand the project to the Preparer with a 
routing sheet that listed how much time had been budgeted for the project, the due date, 
and who the Reviewer was. When the Preparer was finished with the tax return, it was 
given to the Reviewer.  If the Reviewer found any errors, they would give it back to the 
Preparer along with a written explanation of the problems and solutions.  Reviewers 
occasionally corrected Preparers’ mistakes depending on available time, how many times 
the work had already been reviewed, the type of mistake (e.g., spelling), and deadlines.  
This review and correction process could shuffle back and forth between Preparer and 
Reviewer as many as four times.  Once the final review was finished, the Partner signed 
off on the tax return and sent it to the Administrative Department for final processing 
(e.g., photocopying and binding).  The final step was when the end product was sent to 
the client.    
The process map was analyzed to identify any disconnects that were affecting the 
timeliness, cost, effort, quality, and/or quantity of work.  Disconnects were categorized 
into three major areas: obtaining needed information from a client or another employee 
within the company, assignment and preparation of projects, and review and revision of 
work that was about to be reviewed or had already been reviewed.   
Performance problems and solutions.  After the assessment, Dr. Cloyd Hyten and 
I had two separate meetings with the Partners and Managers.  We presented them with 
the “Is” process map, a synopsis of the problems at hand, and possible solutions.  Here is 
an outline of some of the problems that were identified in each of the three categories.   
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A. Obtaining Needed Information:   
1. It was not always clear who to ask or where to go for answers or information. 
2. More experienced employees went straight to the source; whereas, less-
experienced employees took longer to access information.   
3. The method of asking for information (face-to-face, e-mail, note-in-box) 
affected how long it took to get an answer.   
B. Assignment and Preparation of Projects:   
1. Partners were bypassing the regular assignment process, which was interfering 
with employees’ workload and prioritizing of work. 
2. Prioritizing work was inconsistent because it involved many variables such as 
deadlines, current workload, Partner requests, and nature of the task.  
3. Simpler tax returns went through the same lengthy preparation and review 
process as more complex returns.   
C. Reviews and Revisions: 
1. Some employees were conducting better self-checks than were others.    
2. Most projects were requiring multiple reviews. 
3. Prioritizing revisions with the current workload was complicated.    
Intervention.  During the process mapping meetings, the Partners and Managers 
decided that the best course of action would be to focus on streamlining the process for 
simpler tax returns while retaining the regular process for regular returns.  The nature of 
their business made it difficult to work on some of the other issues identified in the 
assessment.  For example, standardizing prioritizing of work would be difficult because 
there will always be unexpected work that needs to be completed and therefore re-
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prioritized.  The Partners wanted to work on an issue that would have a greater impact on 
the bottom line.  They indicated that the old process increased cost and decreased 
turnaround time of the simplest tax returns.  An improved process for these jobs could 
lower their costs, increase their throughput, and free up time and personnel to work on 
the more complex tax returns.     
Tax returns processed through the new streamlined process were called “one-
ways” because the process was no longer bi-directional (i.e., the regular process in which 
work flowed from Preparer to Reviewer and back to Preparer for revision).  The tax 
returns included in the one-way process were chosen because they were estimated to take 
about 5 hr or less to complete.  The one-way process still consisted of the same five 
stages: client requests, work assignment, preparation, review, and final processing.  Some 
of the steps involved in these five stages were changed.  The main difference between the 
one-way process and the regular process was in the preparation and review stages.  Only 
Staff prepared the one-way returns.  The justification for doing so was twofold: Staff 
have a lower billing rate (hourly rate billed to the client) and are experienced enough to 
complete the tax return in a timely manner with few mistakes.  The Review stage of the 
process changed in a few ways.  Only Seniors would conduct reviews on one-way 
returns.  This change was made for the same reasons that Staff were preparing the one-
ways: they have a lower billing rate than the usual Reviewers (Partners, Sr. Managers, 
and Managers), and they are skilled enough to be able to find the types of errors that 
might occur with a simple tax return.  It also served the purpose of giving Seniors 
training in the more technical aspects of tax returns.  The nature of reviews also differed 
with the one-way returns.  While the Reviewers would still find technical, grammatical, 
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and formatting errors, now they would also correct these errors.  The Partners told the 
Preparers to finish as much of the returns as possible.  Reviewers would then finish the 
incomplete work and correct all changes without sending the work back to the original 
Preparer for revision.  
The “Should” process map illustrates how the old process was streamlined by 
making changes within or between process steps (boxes). Please see the one-way process 
map in Appendix A.  Within-step changes included switching performers and changing 
the nature of the process step.  Between-step alterations involved adding, eliminating, 
and/or combining steps.  
The assignment phase of the process changed by eliminating step 3 in which 
Partners sometimes assigned work.  Step 8 was altered by changing the performer level 
and tasks completed by the performer.  Preparers no longer photocopied client documents 
because it was now an Administrative employee’s duty.  Instead of having all levels of 
employees preparing tax returns, one-way returns were completed by Staff.  The new 
process had Reviewers addressing client questions, which eliminated steps 9c, 9e, 9f, 9g, 
and 9h.  Step 13 changed because Seniors were now functioning as Reviewers and they 
were identifying and correcting mistakes instead of writing review notes for Preparers.  
Changing step 13 altered what happened between preparation and review and made steps 
14, 14a, 15, and 16 unnecessary.   
Design 
 An AB design (Barlow & Hersen, 1984) was used to assess the impact of the 
process improvement intervention.  Because the new process was not introduced until 
January of 2000, any data generated before then functioned as baseline.  All data were 
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collected from historical records kept on operational and financial measures.  These data 
were collected from January to June of 1999 (baseline) and 2000 (intervention).  The first 
half of each year constitutes the “tax season” for the company when the Tax Department 
does most of its work.  The AB design thus permits a comparison of performance during 
the “tax season” under the old, regular process and under the new process that included 
one-way processing of simple returns.  Such a design does not permit the degree of 
control obtainable by more sophisticated designs such as reversal or multiple baseline 
designs, but such designs were not possible in this case.  Tax Partners and Managers 
chose to implement the new process and requested an evaluation of its impact after its 
first use.  In addition to the financial and operational data, Seniors and Staff involved in 
the one-way process were surveyed in June of 2000 to determine their reactions to the 










         In order to assess the impact of the one-way process, financial and operational data 
were retrieved from computerized archives and analyzed.  Comparisons were made 
between one-way tax returns that were processed in 2000 and similar tax returns 
(prepared for the same clients) completed in the regular process in 1999. Operational data 
included turnaround days (the number of calendar days that work was being done on a 
project), turnaround hours (hours spent on assigning, preparing, reviewing, and final 
processing), preparation time, review time, and preparation plus review time. To assess 
the financial impact of the one-ways on department performance, overall Tax Department 
financial data were also compared.  Financial data included production (hours worked x 
employee’s billing rate), dollars billed to client, realization (production/dollars billed to 
client x 100), and profitability percentage (net direct income/production).  The firm’s 
standard for realization is 90%, which means the goal is to bill at least 90% of the cost of 
production to clients.  If they bill a smaller percentage of the production costs, the project 
will no longer be profitable.  The realization cutoff point is based on how much it 
actually costs to produce work for clients, considering overhead and other miscellaneous 
expenses.  The firm’s profitability standard is 66%. The one-way process was first 
introduced in January of 2000.  During the 2000 tax season, 142 one-way tax returns 
were processed, but data were only available for 109 of these projects.  Out of the 109 
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one-ways processed in 2000, 77 of them were also prepared in 1999 through the regular 
process.  Because the one-way process did not exist in 1999, the 77 returns that were 
processed in 1999 and 2000 will be referred to as the simple tax returns.  In other words, 
simple tax returns that were completed in 1999 went through the regular process while 
simple tax returns finished in 2000 went through the one-way process.   
Operational Data 
Turnaround days.  Table 1 shows data comparisons for operational and financial data 
in 1999 and 2000.  The average number of turnaround days for the 77 returns compared 
in 1999 and 2000 decreased from 27 in 1999 to 17 in 2000.  The work that was done 
during these days included assignment, preparation, review, photocopying, binding, and 
mailing.  The number of days also reflects the downtime that occurs between reviews and 
revisions, when waiting to get more information from a client, and/or when waiting to get 
a question answered by a company employee.   
Figure 1 depicts changes in turnaround days from 1999 to 2000.  Increases and 
decreases reflect comparisons of the year 2000 one-ways against the same returns that 
went through the regular process in 1999.  The data show that 47% (36 out of 77) of the 
projects showed an increase in the number of turnaround days.  The graph also indicates 
that 48% (37 out of 77) of the projects showed a decrease in the number of turnaround 
days.  About 5% (4 out of 77) of the projects had an equal number of turnaround days in 
1999 and 2000. 
Turnaround hours.  Turnaround hours represent the total number of hours spent 
preparing and reviewing the return.  It also includes time spent by the Administrative 
Department for such tasks as assigning, photocopying, binding, and mailing final copies 
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to clients.  All data represent comparisons of time spent on projects in 1999 and 2000.  
Average turnaround hours decreased from 4 hr and 14 min in 1999 to 3 hr and 44 min in 
2000 (Please see Table 1).    Figure 2 reflects changes in turnaround days as a comparison 
of simple returns from 1999 to 2000.  The graph reveals that 35% (27 out of 77) of the 
projects processed in 1999 and 2000 showed an increase in turnaround hours in 2000.  It 
also indicates that 62% (48 out of 77) of the projects showed a decrease in turnaround 
hours in 2000.  Approximately 3% (2 out of 77) of the projects had an equal number of 
turnaround hours in 1999 and 2000. 
Preparation & review.  Complete preparation and review time information was only 
available for 26 out of the 77 simple returns that were processed in 1999 and 2000. 
Average time spent preparing tax returns decreased from 4 hr and 15 min in 1999 to 3 hr 
and 3 min in 2000.  Figure 3 depicts changes that occurred in preparation time between 
1999 and 2000.  Out of the 26 projects, 31% (8 out of 26) showed an increase in 
preparation time in 2000 and 69% (18 out of 26) showed a decrease.  
Average time spent reviewing simple tax returns decreased from 1 hr and 33 min in 
1999 to 1 hr and 6 min in 2000.    Figure 4 represents changes in review time from 1999 
and 2000.  The graph indicates that 39% (10 out of 26) of the projects processed in 1999 
and 2000 showed an increase in review time in 2000 while 61% (16 out of 26) of the 
projects showed a decrease. 
 Data were also collected on the combined time spent preparing and reviewing tax 
returns.  Average time spent preparing and reviewing tax returns decreased from 5 hr and 
48 min in 1999 to 4 hr and 9 min in 2000.  Figure 5 shows that for 31% (8 out of 26) of 
the projects, there was an increase in time spent preparing and reviewing simple tax 
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returns in 2000 compared to the same tax returns in 1999.  The graph also shows that 
65% (17 out of 26) of the projects showed a decrease in preparation and review time in 
2000.  Only 4% (1 out of 26) of the projects processed in 1999 and 2000 showed no 
change in preparation and review time in 2000. 
Financial Data 
The firm processes different types of tax returns (e.g., individual and business 
returns).  The type of tax return is one of the variables that determine how long it will 
take to prepare the tax return.  Individual returns are generally simpler and, therefore, 
take a shorter amount of time.  A number of clients have their individual and business tax 
returns prepared by the firm.  Some of these clients’ individual and/or children’s tax 
returns were included in the one-way process while their business return was processed in 
the regular process.  Because the firm usually bills clients when all of their work is 
completed, these clients who had multiple types of returns being processed were not 
billed until after June 2000.  The data used in this study represents year-to-date 
information from January (start of tax season) to June for 1999 and 2000.  Only 68 out of 
the 77 simple tax returns that were processed in both 1999 and 2000 had complete data 
because the other 9 projects had not been billed as of June 2000 and therefore were not 
included in the final analysis of this study.   
Production and dollars billed.  Billing rates represent how much clients are billed (per 
hour) for work completed.  The billing rate increases as the job title gets higher.  For 
example, Staff have the lowest billing rates; whereas, Partners have the highest.  This is 
not to be confused with hourly wage, which is how much employees are paid an hour.  
The following formula is used to calculate production: billing rate X hours worked.   
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Production data were available for all 77 of the simple tax returns that were processed 
in 1999 and 2000; however, only the 68 that had already been billed at the time of the 
study were used in calculating production figures.  Table 1 shows that total cost of 
production for all simple tax returns decreased from $35,197 in 1999 to $32,497 in 2000.  
The production data had to take into account that billing rates were raised for some 
employees in 2000.  In order to control for these increases, both dollar amounts for 
production were adjusted for the average billing rate on one-ways in 2000.  An average 
billing rate for 2000 was calculated by first taking the total production dollars for all of 
the tax returns the Tax Department processed in 2000 and dividing it by the total 
turnaround hours for the same projects in 2000.  This generated an average billing rate of 
$107.81 for the year 2000.  Then, the average billing rate in 2000 was multiplied by the 
total number of turnaround hours in 1999 and 2000 respectively. Because increases in 
billing rates were controlled for, this decrease in production means that fewer hours were 
spent working on one-way tax returns in 2000 than were spent working on the same tax 
returns the year before.  The average cost of production per return decreased from 
$457.10 in 1999 to $422.04 in 2000 (please see Table 1).    
Of the 68 clients who were billed, total dollars billed increased from $25,809 in 1999 
to $28,081 in 2000.    The average dollars billed to clients per return increased from 
$379.54 in 1999 to $412.96 in 2000.  Figure 6 illustrates the percent of projects showing 
an increase, decrease, or no change in client bills from 1999 to 2000.  The graph indicates 
that 51.5% (35 out of 68) of the simple returns showed an increase in the amount billed to 
the client in 2000.  The average increase in the clients’ bills from 1999 to 2000 was about 
$194.96 or 66%.  It also shows that 47% (32 out of 68) of the simple returns that were 
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processed in 1999 and 2000 showed a decrease in the amount billed to the client.  The 
average decrease was approximately $214.23 or 48% from the client’s bill in 1999.  
While almost half of the projects showed a decrease in the amount billed to the client, the 
realization for 84% (27 out of 32) of these projects was at or above the firm standard 
(90%).  This meant that these projects were still profitable although the amount billed to 
the client had decreased.  The graph also shows that 63% (20 out of 32) of the projects 
that billed clients less in 2000 still showed an increase in realization from 1999.  This 
indicates that, for the projects that were billed less in 2000, percentage of production 
dollars billed to the client increased.  Only 1 out of 68 of the simple tax returns processed 
in 1999 and 2000 showed no change in the amount billed to the client.   
Realization.  Average realization for simple tax returns increased from 89% in 1999 
to 103% in 2000 (please see Table 1).  Figure 7 shows changes in realization from 1999 
to 2000.  Of the simple tax returns processed in 1999, 60% had a realization equal to or 
greater than 90%, while 82% of the simple tax returns processed in 2000 had a realization 
equal to or greater than 90%.  Basically, more of the simple tax returns processed in 
2000, versus 1999, were profitable.  Figure 8 shows changes in realization from 1999 to 
2000.  Of the projects processed in 1999 and 2000, 62% (42 out of 68) showed an 
increase in realization in 2000.  Additionally, 83% (35 out of 42) of these projects were 
90% or more realizable.  In 2000, 25% (17 out of 68) of the one-ways showed a decrease 
in realization; however, 65% (11 out of 17) of these projects were at least 90% realizable.  
In other words, the majority of projects that displayed a decrease in realization in 2000 
were still 90%, or more, realizable.  Finally, 13% (9 out of 68) of the projects processed 
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in 1999 and 2000 showed no change in realization from 1999 to 2000, and all of these 
projects had realization percentages of 90% or higher. 
Figure 9 shows the distribution of realization percentages in 1999 and 2000.  This 
graph shows that realization ranges started much lower (7-9%) and ended lower (110-
119%) in 1999 when compared with 2000 tax returns.  In 2000, the realization range 
started higher (50-59%) and ended higher (180-189%).  This graph also shows that there 
were fewer projects in 1999 with realization above 90%; whereas, the majority of 
projects in 2000 had realization percentages at or above 90%.   
Overall Tax Department Financial Data 
 Financial data for the Tax Department as a whole is representative of year-to-date 
figures from January to June of 1999 and 2000.  These data were calculated using 
production and billing information for all the projects (regular and one-way tax returns) 
that were completed and billed by June, 1999 and 2000, respectively.  The Tax 
Department prepared 1435 tax returns (sum of complex and simple) in 1999 and 1584 in 
2000.  Realization increased from 91% in 1999 to 99% in 2000.  Profitability increased 
from 58% in 1999 to 66.5% in 2000.  The production amount for all returns processed in 
the Tax Department increased from $1,684,008 in 1999 to $1,733,748 in 2000.  This 
represents a 3% increase.   
When a client is not billed the total cost of production, the amount not billed is 
considered a write-off.  Write-offs are directly related to realization.  For example, if 4% 
of production is written off, it means that project was 96% realizable.  The firm does not 
want write-offs to exceed 10% or realization will fall below the 90% standard.  In 1999, 
write-offs amounted to $143,232 while that amount was $14,751 in 2000.  Department 
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net direct income (DNDI) represents how much money the department is generating for 
the firm.  DNDI increased from $975,442 in 1999 to $1,154,472 in 2000.  71.8% of this 
increase is due to lower write-offs.  This was calculated by taking the difference between 
write-offs in 1999 ($142,232) and 2000 ($14,751) and dividing by the difference between 
DNDI in 1999 ($975,442) and 2000 ($1,154,472).     
Quality Assessment Data 
Because the company did not have any quality measures in place, it was necessary 
to create some.  Had I been part of the implementation phase of the new process, a 
quality measure would have been created at that time.  However, this was not the case, so 
a Quality Assessment survey was created as a post-intervention measure.  Although this 
is not quantitative data, it does provide added insight into quality areas that may be 
examined further.  
This Quality Assessment survey was administered in June of 2000 to determine 
the quality of work that was reviewed during the 2000 tax season.  Seniors conducted the 
reviews for the one-way tax season; however, a few Managers also filled out the surveys 
because they were familiar with the quality of work generated from the one-way tax 
returns.  Surveys were anonymous, so the exact breakdown of how many Seniors and 
Managers filled out the Quality Assessment form is not known.  Reviewers rated the 
frequency with which they observed corresponding statements.  A rating of 1 meant that 
the corresponding statement never occurred (0 % of the time) while a 5 meant that the 
corresponding statement always occurred (100% of the time). Out of the 4 Managers and 
11 Seniors, six turned in completed forms.  See Appendix C for the original questions 
and for tallies of all answers.  
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Most Reviewers (5 out of 6) said that Preparers turned in accurate and complete 
returns approximately 50-75% of the time while one Reviewer said that Preparers never 
turned in accurate or complete returns.  Approximately 25-75% of the time, unfinished 
returns were due to Preparers receiving incomplete client information.  Most of the 
Reviewers (5 out of 6) said that inaccurate returns were due to Preparers’ carelessness 
about 25% of the time while one senior felt that Preparers’ carelessness was responsible 
in about 50% of tax returns.  When asked if they thought that Preparers were turning in 
unfinished work that could have been done, individual Reviewers said it occurred 
between 0-75% of the time.  One Reviewer said it occurred 75% of the time, another said 
it never occurred, and two each said that it occurred 25% to 50% of the time.          
Satisfaction Survey Results 
An employee satisfaction survey was administered in June 2000 to the Reviewers 
and Preparers who participated in the one-way process.  The focus of this survey was to 
determine how the employees in this group viewed the new one-way process, their front-
end understanding of the new process, and their opinion on whether or not the new 
process should continue next tax season.  Four out of the five Preparers (Staff employees) 
that were present during the 2000 tax season completed the survey.  Again, six out of the 
11 Seniors and 4 Managers filled out the Reviewer’s satisfaction survey.  Because 
Preparers and Reviewers executed different functions in the one-way process, they were 
given different surveys. Employees were asked to rate their level of agreement on a 
Likert scale from 1 to 4 with corresponding statements.  A rating of 1 meant they strongly 
disagreed and a 4 meant they strongly agreed.  See Appendix C for original questions and 
for tallies of all answers.   
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In general, all employees understood the objective of the new process and the 
difference between the regular process and the new process.  While the Reviewers 
showed little consensus on whether or not the new process achieved its purpose, 
Preparers unanimously agreed that the new process achieved its purpose.  
Most Preparers (3 out of 4) agreed that they preferred working on other types of 
returns versus the one-way returns.  Most Reviewers (4 out of 6) said they would have 
preferred reviewing one-way returns instead of working on other returns.  Only half of 
the Reviewers felt that reviewing one-way tax returns helped to improve their technical 
skills.  Half of the Preparers agreed that the one-way tax returns enabled them to work on 
more difficult tax returns.  None of the Preparers felt that completing one-way tax returns 
improved their technical skills.  
Less than half of the Reviewers (2 out of 6) and half of the Preparers felt that the new 
process needed changes.  Some of these changes probably have to do with the way tax 
returns were chosen to be included in the one-way process.  More than half of the 
Reviewers (5 out of 6) and all of the Preparers agreed that the one-way tax returns should 
be chosen more carefully next year.  However, 5 of the 6 Reviewers and all of the 
Preparers agreed that the criteria for including tax returns in the one-way process were 
appropriate.  The inclusion criteria were based on estimated time to complete the return 
and complexity level.  During informal interviews, the Preparers and Reviewers agreed 
with the set criteria for inclusion, but did not agree with exceptions made to these criteria.  
For example, some tax returns did fall within the estimated time and difficulty criteria but 
had an excessive amount of missing information, which caused the return to exceed the 
estimated time.   
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Other changes suggested by survey respondents involve the assignment process 
and photocopying process for the one-way tax returns.  Managers usually assign work in 
the regular process, but an Administrative employee assigned work in the one-ways 
because Partners felt that they could assign work just as well as a Manager if the tax 
return was simple.  Half of the Preparers agreed that they would like to continue seeing 
the Administrative Department assign one-way returns.  Administrative employees were 
also photocopying client information for Preparers because simple returns do not require 
many photocopies.  However, the Partners and Managers felt that they could save on 
production amount by having Administrative employees do the photocopying at a lower 
billing rate and charging clients the usual amount for photocopying.  Administrative 
employees do not usually photocopy clients’ documents for preparation because they 
require some deciphering as to what information is needed and, therefore, photocopied.   
None of the Preparers would like to see the Administrative Department continue to make 
client photocopies for one-way returns. None of the Preparers or Reviewers would like to 
return to the regular tax return process next year.  In other words, they would like to 
continue seeing simple tax returns go through the one-way process and more difficult tax 
returns go through the regular process. Overall, all the Preparers and Reviewers agreed 
that they would recommend using the one-way process in the next tax season. 
The Employee Satisfaction Survey also targeted Reviewers’ satisfaction with the 
review process of one-way tax returns.  Most of the Reviewers (5 out of 6) did not feel 
that time spent on reviewing one-ways was excessive.  Some Reviewers (3 out of 5) felt 
that reviewing one-ways prevented them from working on more complex returns.  All 
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Reviewers felt that the mistakes they found during reviews could have been fixed by the 













 This analysis of the one-way process suggests that it had the desired effect on key 
financial and operational data.  Comparisons of financial data in 1999 and 2000 revealed 
that work completed in the new one-way process in 2000 was cheaper to produce and 
more profitable than similar returns processed regularly in 1999.  The one-way process 
also improved the efficiency of work by shortening both preparation and review times.  
In addition, turnaround time decreased indicating that throughput in the entire process 
was enhanced.  The Tax Department’s entire workload was not analyzed, so the effect of 
the one-way process on the processing of more complex returns is not known in any 
direct manner.  However, financial data for the Tax Department as a whole indicated that 
the department’s performance improved in 2000.  This evidence suggests that, at a 
minimum, the one-way process did not harm other work done accurately in that 
department to any significant degree.   
 It is possible that the one-way returns contributed to the improvements seen in the 
department’s overall performance, although the degree of that contribution could not be 
determined from the present data.  A more comprehensive (and daunting) analysis of all 
the work completed in the Tax Department would be necessary to isolate the 
contributions of the one-way process to the department’s overall performance.  Such an 
analysis was not deemed worthwhile in this study because several other changes in the 
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organization may have affected work done in the one-way and in the regular process.  
These potential confounds make it impossible to isolate the contribution of the one-way 
process to department performance.  It is clear that returns processed in the new one-way 
process were cheaper, faster, and more profitable; it is not clear that the one-way process 
was the only factor contributing to these results.  Additional factors will be discussed 
below.   
Financial Data 
There was a 9% increase in dollars billed to clients, which could be due to the 
increases in billing rates and/or higher realization (lower write-offs).  Total amount billed 
to clients is not as important as realization.  Increases in total amount could be 
representative of increases in billing rates or volume of work or a combination of both.  
However, increases in realization, or realization percentages of 90% or higher, indicate 
that more of the work being produced is being billed to the client.  This translates into 
high profits.  In other words, the goal is not necessarily only to produce more, but also, to 
bill more of what is produced.  In the 2000 tax season, more of what was produced was 
billed.  
 Total production decreased while dollars billed to client increased.  This is 
reflected in the increased realization for 2000.  Improved realization may have been 
affected by several variables.  A new incentive compensation program for Managers and 
Senior Managers started in the beginning of 2000.  This new incentive compensation 
program encouraged Billers (anyone who writes the final bill for the client) to write off 
less work as one of many components designed to improve financial results.  This may 
have motivated the Billers to simply bill for more of the work that was done, even work 
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that would not have been considered efficient or justifiable in 1999.  However, the fact 
that turnaround days and hours decreased in 2000 indicates that one-ways were processed 
more efficiently.  Basically, the same amount of work was completed in fewer days and 
hours (on average) but the client was billed just as much or more than in 1999.  With 
regard to the one-way returns, higher realizations appeared to be attributable to the higher 
efficiency of the work not just to pressure to inflate realization.  It is possible that 
pressure to inflate realization interacted with the effects of the one-way process to lend to 
the high realization percentages observed in 2000. 
Another possible confound in the analysis of results is related to employee 
experience.  Of the five Staff employees who prepared one-way tax returns in 2000, three 
were also there in the 1999 tax season.  These three employees had the benefit of working 
on simple tax returns for a year.  Having an extra year’s experience may have improved 
their skills enough to generate decreases in preparation time for one-ways.  At this point, 
I cannot ascertain what impact, if any, this experience had on the preparation data, so 
employee experience may account for some of the improvement seen in the year 2000 
data. 
Operational Data 
Apart from possible confounds, there are reasons why the new one-way process may 
have contributed to the improvements in the specific financial and operational measures 
used to compare the similar returns completed in 1999 and 2000.  Preparation time was 
expected to decrease in the one-way process because the nature of preparation work 
changed.  In the regular process, Preparers do all the work necessary to complete a tax 
return.  This could include getting questions answered by another firm employee (e.g., 
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Manager or Partner) and/or getting information from the client.  It could also include 
reviewing and correcting mistakes found in review, which could occur more than once 
per project.  However, in the one-way process, Preparers were told to complete as much 
of the return as possible before passing it on to the reviewer.  The reduction in 
preparation time could reflect the time that Preparers would normally spend getting 
information from other firm employees or clients and/or correcting errors found in 
review.  Staff are less experienced employees and usually work on the simpler tax returns 
as well as on parts of more complex tax returns.  They are skilled enough to complete a 
simple tax return on their own, given all the necessary information.  If they are not given 
complete information at the beginning of the process, they have to spend time retrieving 
this information.  The initial assessment of the regular tax return process indicated that 
less experienced employees took longer to retrieve needed information from other firm 
employees.  On the other hand, more experienced employees were better at getting this 
type of information.  Also, the more-experienced employees were given clearance to 
contact clients if necessary.  Since less-experienced employees are usually not given this 
clearance, they must rely on other employees to get this information for them.  This can 
add unnecessary time to a project.  In the one-way process they no longer had to do this.  
They could complete what they could, make a list of questions/concerns, and pass it on to 
the Reviewer who would get the questions answered and thus complete the return 
themselves.   
While doing this saves time in the process, it may encourage passing on incomplete 
work that could have been done.  Results from the Quality Assessment Survey indicate 
that this area should be looked into in the future.  Most of the Reviewers felt that 
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Preparers were passing on incomplete tax returns that could have been corrected or 
completed before being passed on for the one-way review.  This lends more support to 
the notion that the new process may have encouraged Preparers to pass on incomplete 
work to Reviewers.   
It may seem counterintuitive to have a Senior reviewing simple tax returns because 
they are more experienced and should be working on more complex returns.  In addition, 
they have a higher billing rate than the Staff that does the majority of preparation.  
However, reviewing one-ways gave Seniors the opportunity to improve technical skills.  
This skill is compulsory to move up into a management position.  In terms of the billing 
rate issue, because Seniors were more experienced they were capable of reviewing and, 
when necessary, completing the simple tax returns faster, more accurately, and more 
efficiently than a less experienced Staff employee.  This results in fewer hours spent 
working at their higher billing rate.   
Overall, the one-way process was faster.  The decrease in turnaround days indicates 
that there was less down time in the 2000 one-ways.  A possible explanation for this 
decrease is that one-way returns were no longer bi-directional, like regular returns.  In 
other words, work was no longer being shuffled back and forth between Preparers and 
Reviewers.  The one-way projects flowed in one direction, and the employees who 
worked on these projects knew how to get work done and how to get information when 
they needed it.   Less experienced Preparers did not have to wait to get questions 
answered as they may have to in the regular process and Reviewers did not have to wait 
for Preparers’ revisions.    
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Average turnaround hours decreased by 20 minutes.  Again, Preparers were not 
submitting their work for a regular Review; therefore, they did not have to deal with 
review notes and revisions, which can cause added hours and days to a project’s 
turnaround time.  In addition, Reviewers did not have to conduct multiple reviews.  Not 
only do revisions take time to complete, but it usually takes additional time for Preparers 
and Reviewers to re-familiarize themselves with a tax return they have not seen in a few 
days.   
Survey Data 
The quality assessment identified an inconsistency between job levels as to whether 
or not the one-way process achieved its purpose. The purpose of the new process was 
different according to employee level.  The new process intended to give Staff simpler 
tax returns that they could complete in a short amount of time without having to correct 
mistakes found during reviews.  At the same time, Seniors were reviewing and fixing 
mistakes found during their reviews.  Overall, the new process was supposed to give 
Seniors more time to work on more difficult reviews while also giving them review 
experience, in the hopes of improving their technical skills.  Since the purpose was multi-
layered for the Seniors, it seems that the new process was possibly successful at fulfilling 
some layers but not all.   
Preparers reported that completing one-ways did not improve their technical 
skills.  This may be because the returns were so simple that Preparers were capable of 
completing the tax returns on their own.  Another possible explanation can be due to 
Reviewers not giving Preparers feedback on their performance, as they would in the 
regular process in the form of written review notes.  
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The survey data indicated that the issue of who should photocopy client 
documents deserves some extra attention.  Preparers indicated that they would prefer 
photocopying client documents themselves before starting the tax return.  This is what 
usually happens in the regular process; however, Partners thought having Administrative 
employees photocopy client documents would shave time off of preparation work.  This 
would assist in making one-way returns more profitable. During informal interviews, 
Preparers articulated their concerns about this issue.  Some of the Preparers felt that 
making their own photocopies was a necessary step in getting familiar with a client’s file 
before starting the project.  Other Preparers were not so much concerned about using the 
photocopy time to get familiar with a project, but were concerned about Administrative 
employees not photocopying the correct documents or photocopying the correct 
documents but in the wrong format (landscape versus portrait).  Preparation time data 
does not indicate that this issue had an effect on the final results.  However, because all 
the Preparers expressed concern, it may be worthwhile to examine this practice in 
subsequent tax seasons. 
Future Refinements to the One-Way Process 
It may be worthwhile to re-examine the inclusion rule for one-ways.  I would 
suggest looking further into the impact of one-ways that had incomplete information at 
the front-end to determine if these projects took longer and were less profitable than jobs 
with more complete information.  Tax returns were selected for inclusion in the one-way 
process by examining how long they took to complete in 1999.  But time to complete the 
return in any year can be affected by how complete the necessary information is prior to 
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the start of preparation work.  Perhaps the completeness of client information should be a 
factor in the inclusion criteria for one-way returns.  
Another area to examine further are the variables that caused some one-ways to 
have higher or lower turnaround days, preparation time, and review time then the 
majority of one-way returns.  Those one-ways that had higher and lower realization could 
also be examined to determine whether any characteristics of the returns itself, or the 
practice of the Preparers and Billers might affect these measures.  If such variables could 
be identified, information could be considered when deciding whether or not to include a 
project in the one-way process.   
In conclusion, process redesign can be an effective method for improving  
performance.  Working with the firm’s management personnel, an analysis of the existing 
processes revealed an opportunity to try a new process.  The one-way process streamlined 
an existing process that functioned well for certain types of tax returns but was too time-
consuming for simpler tax returns.  The new process effectively changed and, in some 
cases, eliminated inefficient process steps.  Rummler and Brache (1995) claimed that 
processes are key to understanding organizational performance.  The current study 
supplies much-needed quantitative data showing that process improvement interventions 












1. What services do you offer?
What do you want to see from this
process map?
-Any specific info?
2. What are you going to be using the
process map for?
Work Assignment and Getting Started
3. How does work come in?
- Through partners, mgrs., etc.
4. How does process vary by partner?
5. How is work assigned?
- How do you categorize
assignments?
6. What happens from the time that
work is assigned to the time you get
started?
7. Does it require getting any additional
info from client?
8. Who retrieves that info: staff or
manager?
9. What else is necessary before a
return can be started: info, skills, etc.
Completing Assignment and Review
Process
10. What happens from the time that you
start return to the time that you
finish?
11. What do you do when you are
finished?
12. Who reviews the work?
- Does this depend on type of job?
13. Do all projects get reviewed the
same number of times before being
given to client?
- Does it depend on size of
project/client?
- Does it depend on time?
- Does it depend on staff skills?
14. What do you look for in reviews?
15. What do you do if there are errors?
16. How much time given to correct
errors?
17. Do reviewers ever correct errors
themselves?
18. What do you do if there are no
errors?
19. Are reviews based on client
needs/wants or industry based
needs/wants?
Variances
20. What areas in the process vary the
most from project to project?
21. Vary by time spent, skills needed,
review time?
22. What is variance due to: type of
project, client, and/or staff skills?
23. How much time/money does each
step cost the company?
- How does this vary?
24. Do you ever rely on other
department to get work done?
Client Needs
25. How do you know when client needs
haven’t been met?
26. Is there a measurement system in
place?
27. Does client usually tell you?
28. Do you rely on repeat business as an
indicator?
Conclusion
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Internal Process Flow - "Is Map" By Stage
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Internal Process Flow - "Should Map" By Stage



















































































































Table 1  
Data Comparisons for 1999 and 2000
Operational Data 1999 2000
Average Turnaround Days 27 17
Average Turnaround Hours 4:14 3:44
Average Preparation Time 4:15 3:03
Average Review Time 1:33 1:06
Average Prep + Review Time 5:48 4:09
Financial Data 1999 2000
Total Production $35,197 $32,497
Average Production $457 $422
Total Dollars Billed $25,809 $28,081
Average Dollar Billed $380 $413
Average Realization 89% 103%
Note:  Turnaround and production data were generated from 
           77 of the simple returns processed in 1999 and 2000.  
           Preparation and review time data represent 26 out of 
           77 of the simple tax returns processed in 1999 and 
           2000.  Dollars billed and realization data represent 
           68 out of the 77 simple tax returns processed in 1999














36 out of 77 
Projects




Figure 1.  Percent of projects showing increases, decreases, or no change in 
turnaround days from 1999 to 2000.  Data represents 100% (77) of 















27 out of 77 
Projects






Figure 2.  Percent of projects showing increases, decreases, or no change in 
turnaround hours from 1999 to 2000.  Data represents 100% (77) of 














8 out of 26 projects
18 out of 26 projects
31%
69%
Figure 3.  Percent of projects showing increases or decreases in preparation 
time from 1999 to 2000.  Data represents 34% (26 out of 77) of the 















10 out of 26 projects
16 out of 26 Projects
39%
61%
Figure 4.  Percent of projects showing increases or decreases in review time  
from 1999 to 2000.  Data represents 34% (26 out of 77) of the one-






























8 out of 26 
Projects
17 out of 26 
Projects
Figure 5.  Percent of projects showing increases, decreases, or no change in 
preparation + review time from 1999 to 2000.  Data represents 34% 
(26 out of 77) of the one-way projects processed in 2000.
Increased No ChangeDecreased

























35 out of 68 





Figure 6.  Percent of projects showing increases, decreases, or no change in 
amount billed to client  from 1999 to 2000.  Data represents 88% (68
out of 77) of the one-way projects processed in 2000.
Increased No ChangeDecreased


























41 out of 68 Projects
56 out of 68 Projects
60%
82%
Figure 7.  Percent of projects with realization equal to or greater than 90%.  
Data represents 88% (68 out of 77) of the one-way projects 
processed in 2000.




























42 out of 68 
projects
17 out of 68 
projects
9 out of 68 
projects
Figure 8.  Percent of projects showing increases, decreases, or no change in 
realization from 1999 to 2000.  Data represents 34% (26 out of 77) 



























































Figure 9.  Distribution of realization percentages in 1999 and 2000.  Data 
represents 88% (68 out of 77) of the one-way projects processed in 
2000.
Distribution of Realzation Percentages
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APPENDIX C
QUALITY SURVEY AND EMPLOYEE SATISFACTION SURVEYS
Never Sometimes Half the Often Always
Quality Assessment Survey Results Time
1. Preparers turned in accurate returns. 1 3 2
2. Preparers turned in complete returns. 1 3 2
3. Unfinished returns resulted from Preparers receiving incomplete 
     client information. 2 1 3
4. Inaccurate returns were due to Preparers' carelessness. 5 1
5. Unfinished returns were due to Preparers "passing the buck" to 
    Reviewers. 1 2 2 1
6.  The mistakes I found during review were non-technical 
    (e.g., grammar). 3 3
7. The mistakes I found during review were technical. 3 3
8. I informed Preparers of their mistakes after reviewing their work. 1 2 3
Note:  This survey was administered to the Reviewers in the Tax  
            Department.  The table represents the frequency with which they 
            observed the corresponding statement occur.  Six Reviewers 
            completed this survey.
 60
Strongly Disagree Agree Strongly 
Reviewer-Level Satisfaction Survey Results Disagree Agree
1. I know the difference between the one-way process and the regular process. 6
2. I am aware of the objective of the new one-way process. 1 5
3. The new one-way process achieved this objective. (* 2 omitted) 1 1 2
4. I would rather have been working on other types of returns instead of reviewing 
    the new one-way process. 4 2
5. Reviewing one-way returns helped me improve my technical skills. 3 2 1
6. I believe the one-way process does not need any changes.  1 3 1 1
7. The one-way returns should be chosen more carefully in the next tax season. 1 1 3 1
8. I would like to return back to the regular process in the next tax season. 1 4 1
9. The criteria for including a tax return in the one-way process were appropriate. 1 5
10. The time spent on reviewing one-way returns was excessive. 1 4 1
11. Reviewing one-way returns prevented me from working on more 
      complex returns. (* 1 omitted) 2 3
12. The preparers could have fixed the mistakes I was finding in the reviews if they 
      had conducted better self-checks. 4 2
13. I would recommend that we continue using the one-way process in the next 
      tax season. 3 3
Note: This survey was administered to the Reviewers in the Tax Department.  
          The table represents the nubmer of Reviewers who gave the 
          corresponding rating for the respective questions.  Six Reviewers 
          completed the survey; however, a few Reviewers did not give a rating 
          for questions 3 and 11.
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Strongly Disagree Agree Strongly 
Staff-Level Satisfaction Survey Results Disagree Agree
1. I know the difference between the one-way process and the regular process. 4
2. I am aware of the objective of the new one-way process. 1 3
3. The new one-way process achieved this objective. 4
4. I would rather have been working on other types of returns instead of the new 
    one-way returns. 1 2 1
5. The one-way process enabled me to work on more difficult tax returns. 1 1 2
6.  The new one-way returns helped me improve my technical skills. 1 3
7. I believe the one-way process does not need any changes.  2 2
8. I would like to continue seeing Administrative employees make client 
    photocopies for one-way returns. 3 1
9. The one-way returns should be chosen more carefully in the next tax season. 4
10. I would like to continue seeing Administrative employees assign one-way 
      returns. 2 2
11. I would like to return back to the regular process in the next tax season. 4
12. The criteria for including a tax return in the one-way process were appropriate.
        (*1 omitted) 3
13. I would like to receive information about mistakes I made for the one-way 
      tax returns. 3 1
14. I would recommend that we continue using the one-way process in the next 
      tax season. 4
Note:  This survey was administered to the Preparers in the Tax Department.
           The table represents the number of Preparers who gave the corresponding
           rating for the respective questions.  Four Preparers completed the survey;
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